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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines relationship between ownership structure and moral hazard with risk 
taking of Malaysian banks and also investigates the moderating effects of capital regulation 
on these relationships. Despite many claims and arguments that associate high risk taking of 
Malaysian banks with the existence of large shareholders and moral hazard related to loan 
activities (high loan growth and loan concentration), the practices are still prevailing until 
present. The fact that banks are highly regulated also creates issue on how regulation 
moderates the relationship between ownership structure and moral hazard related to loans 
with bank risk taking. Bank risk taking in this study is measured by standard deviation of 
return on equity, standard deviation of return on assets and Z-SCORE (insolvency risk). 
Ownership structure comprised of insider ownership, family ownership, government 
ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. Moral hazard is proxied by loan 
growth and loan concentration while capital regulation is proxied by capital adequacy 
requirement. Using secondary data, total number of observations of this study is 294. Data 
are collected from 21 commercial banks in Malaysia, comprising of 9 domestic banks and 12 
foreign banks over 1990-2008 period. In testing the relationships between ownership 
structure, moral hazard and capital regulation on bank risk taking, two regression test are 
used. Multiple regression is used to test the relationship between ownership structure and 
moral hazard on bank risk taking, while hierarchical moderated multiple regression is used to 
test the moderating effects of capital regulation on the relationship between ownership 
structure and moral hazard to bank risk taking. The multiple regression results revealed that 
different type of ownership structure has different impact on bank risk taking. The results on 
moral hazard show that loan growth increased insolvency risks of banks, while loan 
concentration create variation in bank returns (standard deviation of return on equity) but 
decrease probability of failure (high Z-SCORE) of the banks. Further, hierarchical moderated 
multiple regression revealed that capital adequacy requirement has significant moderating 
impact on the relationship between ownership structure and moral hazard with standard 
deviation of return on equity and insolvency risks. In contrast, it has insignificant moderating 
effects on the relationship between ownership structures and moral hazard with standard 
deviation of return on assets. Overall, findings of this study imply that the existence of large 
shareholders in Malaysian banks does not increase bank risk taking (as measured by 
variations of returns and insolvency risks), the impact of loan growth in increasing banks 
risks will only be felt in the long term while loan concentration, although create variation in 
bank return but would increase bank stability in the long term.  The result also imply that 
capital regulation implemented by Malaysian regulators is appropriate for the Malaysian 
banks as higher capital adequacy requirements might creates unintended effects whereby 
banks might response by increasing their risk taking.   
Key words: bank-risk taking, ownership structure, moral hazard, capital regulation 
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ABSTRAK 
Penyelidikan ini mengkaji perhubungan struktur pemilikan dan kesalahan moral dengan 
pengambilan risiko bank-bank Malaysia dan juga memeriksa kesan penyederhanaan 
undang-undang  modal ke atas perhubungan tersebut. Di sebalik tanggapan dan hujah- 
yang mengaitkan pengambilan risiko bank-bank Malaysia dengan kehadiran pemegang 
saham besar dan kesalahan moral berkaitan aktiviti pinjaman (pertumbuhan pinjaman 
tinggi dan konsentrasi pinjaman), keadaan tersebut terus wujud hingga kini. Kenyataan 
bahawa bank mempunyai regulasi yang tinggi juga mencetuskan isu tentang bagaimana 
regulasi memoderasikan perhubungan di antara struktur pemilikan dan kesalahan moral 
berkaitan pinjaman dengan pengambilan risiko bank. Pengambilan risiko bank diukur 
oleh variasi pulangan atas ekuiti, variasi pulangan atas aset dan juga risiko 
ketidakmampuan membayar (Z-SCORE). Struktur pemilikan terdiri dari pemilikan 
dalaman, keluarga, kerajaan, p institusi dan asing. Kesalahan moral diwakili oleh 
pertumbuhan pinjaman dan konsentrasi pinjaman, sementara undang-undang modal 
diwakili oleh keperluan kecukupan modal. Kajian ini menggunakan data sekunder 9 bank 
tempatan dan 12 bank asing bagi tahun 1995-2008 dengan jumlah keseluruhan 
pemerhatian sebanyak 294.  Analisa berbilang regresi digunakan untuk menguji 
perhubungan struktur pemilikan dan kesalahan moral dengan pengambilan risiko bank, 
sementara regresi berbilang penyederhanaan bertingkat  digunakan untuk menguji kesan 
penyederhanaan undang-undang modal terhadap perhubungan tersebut. Analisa berbilang 
regresi mendedahkan bahawa jenis struktur pemilikan yang berlainan menghasilkan 
kesan yang berlainan ke atas pengambilan risiko bank. Keputusan analisis terhadap 
kesalahan moral menunjukkan pertumbuhan pinjaman meningkatkan risiko 
ketidakmampuan membayar bank, sementara konsentrasi pinjaman mewujudlkan variasi 
di dalam pulangan (variasi pulangan atas ekuiti) tetapi menurunkan kemungkinan 
kegagalan bank. Regresi berbilang penyederhanaan bertingkat pula mendedahkan, 
keperluan kecukupan modal menyederhanakan kesan terhadap perhubungan di antara 
struktur pemilikan dan kesalahan moral dengan variasi pulangan atas ekuiti dan risiko 
ketidakmampuan membayar, tetapi tidak mempunyai kesan penyederhanaan terhadap 
perhubungan struktur pemilikan dan kesalahan moral dengan variasi pulangan atas asset. 
Keseluruhannya, hasil kajian menunjukkan pemegang saham besar di bank-bank 
Malaysia tidak meningkatkan pengambilan risiko bank (diukur dengan variasi di dalam 
pulangan dan risiko ketidakmampuan membayar), pertumbuhan pinjaman meningkatkan 
ketidakmampuan membayar, sementara konsentrasi pinjaman meningkatkan kestabilan 
bank. Seterusnya, undang-undang modal yang dilaksanakan oleh kerajaan Malaysia 
bersesuaian untuk bank-bank Malaysia kerana undang-undang modal yang lebih tinggi 
akan menyebabkan bank meningkatkan pengambilan risiko mereka. 
Katakunci: Pengambilan risiko bank, struktur pemilikan, kesalahan moral, undang-
undang modal 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
 
The financial crises in 1985-1986 and 1997-1998 that had hit Malaysian banks 
revealed the vulnerabilities of the banking industry. The Malaysian banks are highly 
associated with high risk taking due to their concentrated ownership structure and lending 
practices. The existence of large shareholders and moral hazard behavior of banks due to 
high loan growth and concentrated loan portfolio are argued as the main cause of the 
vulnerabilities (i.e., Obiyatullah, 1998; Laeven, 1999). However, despite many claims 
and arguments that relate concentrated ownership and moral hazard through loan 
activities with high risk taking (i.e., Thillainathan, 1999), the trends still prevailing in the 
Malaysian banking sector. Furthermore, capital regulation imposed on the banking 
institutions to manage their risk taking, creates concern on the effects of capital 
regulation in moderating the relationships between ownership structure and moral hazard 
with Malaysian bank risk taking. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
relationship of ownership structure and moral hazard with bank risk taking and also the 
moderating effects of capital regulation on the relationships.   
 
1.1 Risks and Banking Institutions 
 
Risk is very important in evaluating the actual returns and performance of a firm 
(Cade, 1997). Risk is defined as exposure to uncertainty of outcome or the possibility that 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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